Need some info
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Need some info
i have to make this big assignment for school and i decided to do it about the battle of Britain ofcourse! i need to know some info about how many aircraft Britain had to their disposal at the beginning of the battle and how many they had produced at the end of it. thanks for the help lads!
Re: Need some info
Duke, 1st July 1940, Britain had 640 serviceable aircraft and 1103 pilots.
Germany 13 August had 2709 aircraft consisting of bombers, dive bombers, reconnaissance, coastal, fighters and heavy fighters.
1st September 1940, Britian 648 aircraft, 1142 pilots
Source: Stephen Bungay, A most dangerous enemy.
Looking for final Germany numbers also but the start is more widely publicised.
Germany 13 August had 2709 aircraft consisting of bombers, dive bombers, reconnaissance, coastal, fighters and heavy fighters.
1st September 1940, Britian 648 aircraft, 1142 pilots
Source: Stephen Bungay, A most dangerous enemy.
Looking for final Germany numbers also but the start is more widely publicised.
Cheers,
Paddy
Paddy
Group Captain John 'Paddy' Hemingway, we salute you
Re: Need some info
Thanks Paddy. If you could find out a little more about the German numbers that'd be great!
Re: Need some info
Not exactly what youre after but it makes the point. You can always buy the book yourself and its a very brilliant read or use the internet!
“Of the British single-seater fighters, 546, or 72%, were serviceable. The Luftwaffe’s serviceability rate for the end of June is unknown, but on 11 May, when the French campaign opened, it was 73%.
...the 48 squadrons of 754 Hurricanes and Spitfires against 1,464 fighters and 1,808 bombers. The British fighter pilots, from that point of view, were outnumbered by almost four and a half to one. In comparing like with like, however, the Hurricanes and Spitfires would be taking on 1,107 Bf 109s, a ratio of one and a half to one. Most of the other aircraft in the sky (including the Bf 110s) were potential victims. From the Luftwaffe’s point of view, its fighters had to cripple their opponents with a numerical superiority of 3: 2,
However, even if the British pilots did not learn at all, the Luftwaffe had a problem. Given that the Luftwaffe’s own fighter arm had to remain sufficiently intact to protect an invasion fleet against British bombers, and assuming, as the Head of Luftwaffe Intelligence Beppo Schmid did, that the British had 675 serviceable fighters, the Luftwaffe, with about 725, would have to consistently achieve kill ratios in the air of better than 2: 1 in order to eliminate Fighter Command and have a reasonable number of fighters left itself. A kill ratio of 1: 1 would be no good, because the Germans would eliminate themselves, and they had to remain intact. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two whole Geschwader (i.e. about 150 aircraft) over the beachhead all the time. Even if each Geschwader were to fly three sorties a day, this implied a strength of twelve Geschwader, i.e. 900 fighters, somewhat more than the Luftwaffe had to begin with. This suggested that they could not really afford any net losses at all. Given that they could accept a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, they could really only afford to lose about 75 aircraft, which meant that they had to get a kill ratio of the order of 5: 1 in order to reduce Fighter Command’s initial strength by 50% –leaving aside the question of the British replacement rate. The goal of a 5: 1 kill ratio is indeed the one which Osterkamp set JG51 when they took up their positions on the Channel coast in early July. Accordingly, he instructed his pilots only to attack when the tactical situation gave them a sure kill for almost no risk. That would not do, however. The Luftwaffe had five weeks, which meant shooting down a hundred British fighters a week in order to eliminate them, assuming they too had a replacement rate of about 10% per month. This implied intense air activity, and it meant taking chances. If they just waited for the best hunting opportunities, the German fighters would not inflict enough damage in the time available. It was no good getting a kill ratio of 5: 1 if the total British losses were too small in absolute terms. If the British lost a hundred fighters in five weeks and the Germans only twenty, the British would still be able to fight over the beaches, and the Luftwaffe would not have achieved its goal. The Luftwaffe needed big air battles every day. The weather alone would probably prevent this.”
“Of the British single-seater fighters, 546, or 72%, were serviceable. The Luftwaffe’s serviceability rate for the end of June is unknown, but on 11 May, when the French campaign opened, it was 73%.
...the 48 squadrons of 754 Hurricanes and Spitfires against 1,464 fighters and 1,808 bombers. The British fighter pilots, from that point of view, were outnumbered by almost four and a half to one. In comparing like with like, however, the Hurricanes and Spitfires would be taking on 1,107 Bf 109s, a ratio of one and a half to one. Most of the other aircraft in the sky (including the Bf 110s) were potential victims. From the Luftwaffe’s point of view, its fighters had to cripple their opponents with a numerical superiority of 3: 2,
However, even if the British pilots did not learn at all, the Luftwaffe had a problem. Given that the Luftwaffe’s own fighter arm had to remain sufficiently intact to protect an invasion fleet against British bombers, and assuming, as the Head of Luftwaffe Intelligence Beppo Schmid did, that the British had 675 serviceable fighters, the Luftwaffe, with about 725, would have to consistently achieve kill ratios in the air of better than 2: 1 in order to eliminate Fighter Command and have a reasonable number of fighters left itself. A kill ratio of 1: 1 would be no good, because the Germans would eliminate themselves, and they had to remain intact. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two whole Geschwader (i.e. about 150 aircraft) over the beachhead all the time. Even if each Geschwader were to fly three sorties a day, this implied a strength of twelve Geschwader, i.e. 900 fighters, somewhat more than the Luftwaffe had to begin with. This suggested that they could not really afford any net losses at all. Given that they could accept a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, they could really only afford to lose about 75 aircraft, which meant that they had to get a kill ratio of the order of 5: 1 in order to reduce Fighter Command’s initial strength by 50% –leaving aside the question of the British replacement rate. The goal of a 5: 1 kill ratio is indeed the one which Osterkamp set JG51 when they took up their positions on the Channel coast in early July. Accordingly, he instructed his pilots only to attack when the tactical situation gave them a sure kill for almost no risk. That would not do, however. The Luftwaffe had five weeks, which meant shooting down a hundred British fighters a week in order to eliminate them, assuming they too had a replacement rate of about 10% per month. This implied intense air activity, and it meant taking chances. If they just waited for the best hunting opportunities, the German fighters would not inflict enough damage in the time available. It was no good getting a kill ratio of 5: 1 if the total British losses were too small in absolute terms. If the British lost a hundred fighters in five weeks and the Germans only twenty, the British would still be able to fight over the beaches, and the Luftwaffe would not have achieved its goal. The Luftwaffe needed big air battles every day. The weather alone would probably prevent this.”